Power: Authority and Violence — Drawing Chiefly on the Thought of Hannah Arendt

Power: Authority and Violence — Drawing Chiefly on the Thought of Hannah Arendt


By Sheng Hong

  Hannah Arendt said, "The distinction between power and authority is like that between power and violence" (Hannah Arendt, 2011, p. 179). The more important this sentence is, the more one feels it was said too late. In my view, without a clear distinction, the whole of political science can have no sound logical system or theory. When we touch on political questions, we often confuse government as an institution that can enhance welfare with government as an agency held by a person or a group of persons. When we say "absolute power corrupts absolutely," the logical conclusion is to abolish power. But people have not answered why, in reality, power still exists.

Though Hannah Arendt raised this question, she seems not to have given a satisfying answer. The aim of this essay is to continue exploring what power is, and its differences and relations with authority and violence. Given my scholarly background, I will make more use of the analytical methods of economics.

I. Power: Government as an Institution

The power spoken of here is government power. Power, then, arises from the existence of government. Government comes into being because free, voluntary negotiation among individuals cannot solve all problems—some problems can be solved only by a coercive third party adjudicating and enforcing. The problems that must be solved by government are the provision of public goods. This is because externalities, whether positive or negative, prevent the market mechanism from inducing individuals or organizations to provide such goods: the party generating a cost can easily escape bearing it, or the party generating a benefit can hardly capture it. So people created the institution of government.

The government's method of solving market failure—especially the undersupply of public goods—is compulsory charging. In antiquity this took the form of compulsory corvée, including military service; later it evolved into taxation. From the most ideal standpoint, there is an optimal quantity of public goods for the government to provide, and so the amount of taxation should be capped accordingly. At this point the government is an ideal government.

On the other hand, to fulfill its duties the government also needs power. "Power" is what all members of society ought to obey. Because the public goods the government provides—protecting human rights and property rights, maintaining order, adjudicating disputes—all require the parties' compliance; and if someone does not comply, coercive force must be resorted to. Power thus contains the factor of making people comply—both the factor of making people comply automatically and the factor of making people comply by force. The latter is not always manifested in actual action but plays the role of a potential deterrent. And it is indispensable, because, as Buchanan said, institutions are made with the worst case in mind.

Though power must ultimately have violence as its backing, power itself is indispensable. Without power, government does not work. An effective government must have appropriate power to match. Without it, the government cannot provide appropriate public goods, and the society will collapse. When a foreign people invades, for instance, if the government cannot organize an army to resist, the society will be conquered and enslaved; if bandits are everywhere and the government cannot suppress them, the society will decline because property cannot be protected; if the adjudication of disputes cannot be obeyed and enforced, the society will be endlessly riven by conflict for want of justice. To achieve these things there must be power. Power keeps citizens from evading military service, lets the public-security departments effectively suppress bandits, and enforces just adjudication. So Arendt said there is no such thing as excessive power (2011, p. 135). In her view, government power is an optimal institutional arrangement.

II. The First Source of Authority: Sacredness

How, then, does power make people comply? First there must be authority—the force that makes people comply automatically. Where does authority come from? By Hannah Arendt's account, there are at least three sources. First, from the divine; second, from consent; third, from the tradition of formerly successful government.

The "divine," in human society, manifests as religion or a metaphysical cultural tradition. This human institution posits an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good and perfect God who made and governs the rules of the universe, and, quite naturally, made and governs the rules of the human world too. This is God's justice, or the Way of Heaven. If government power is granted by God, that is equivalent to saying the governance it enforces accords with God's justice or the Way of Heaven. Conversely, if it accords with God's justice or the Way of Heaven, it will bring social results of prosperity and popular harmony, and will strengthen the authority of government power.

Of course, authority from the divine or from sacredness cannot be expressed by the surface meaning of "the divine right of kings"—that the ruler falsely claims his power is divinely granted. The deeper meaning of "the divine right of kings" can be explained clearly: this divinity must be higher than the ruler. When the ruler's rule does not accord with the Way of Heaven, the divinity with the right to grant power can also reclaim it. The simple criterion for whether authority possesses sacredness is whether it is binding on all people, including the ruler himself.

Arendt takes the American Revolution as an example. She says that bottom-up compacts and agreements are more than enough to accomplish a revolution but far from enough to establish a new authority. A top-down source lies "in some higher and transcendent region" (2011, p. 168). She says, "The perplexity was how to place law above man, and thereby establish the validity of man-made law; it required the divine, 'indeed it required God'" (2011, p. 170). America's founding fathers clearly recognized this. John Adams "also demanded the worship of a supreme being, also called 'the great Legislator of the universe'"; "Jefferson, in the Declaration of Independence, solemnly appealed to 'the laws of nature and of nature's God'" (2011, p. 171). America's founders "were all deists. Strange as it may seem, it was their persistent belief in an 'afterlife'… not, of course, religious zeal, but a rigorous political misgiving about the great dangers inherent in the secular realm of human affairs, that prompted them to resort to the one traditional religious element whose political usefulness as an instrument of rule was beyond doubt" (2011, p. 177).

"The sacred force possessed by America's founding, as the draft of the Declaration of Independence put it, was 'sacred and undeniable.' What Jefferson raised to the status of a 'higher law,' lending validity to new domestic law and old moral norms, was not reasoning reason but a revealed reason, the 'light of reason'" (2011, p. 180). Arendt concludes, "If the essence of secular law is a command, then it needs a sacredness to lend it validity—a sacredness that is not nature but nature's God, not reason but revealed reason" (2011, p. 181).

Of course, the authority sacredness brings cannot be brought by anything that merely calls itself "sacred." It must come from a concrete resource of sacredness—such as the Protestant resource in America—through the benefits its long-term dominance brings to a society. So the benefit of the Protestant tradition to America is the constitutional structure in which its sacredness and transcendence take part. In this structure any political figure is a mortal under the canopy of an omnipotent God, and must accept the constitutional principles that check and constrain them—principles made on the assumption that they are mortals. This system avoids the errors and disasters that concrete political figures cause when unconstrained. This is the benefit the Protestant sacred tradition brings to America, and it is at the same time one source of the authority of the American government.

On the other hand, sacredness must also rely on a concrete religious tradition accepted by the mainstream of the people. Because different societies arose in different geographical environments and passed through different histories, their religious traditions or quasi-religious cultural traditions differ. But when the principles the government follows contain the traditional principles that most of the people follow, government power contains the authority that makes people comply automatically. America's mainstream European immigrants were English Puritans, and the American society that later formed was predominantly Protestant, so quite naturally the Christian background of the American government is one source of its authority.

III. The Second Source of Authority: The Consent of the People

The second source of authority is the consent of the people. This has two aspects. First, the composition of the government, its functions, and the power granted to it are consented to by the people; second, the principles of social order the government enforces—especially those coercively enforced—come from rules the people have already accepted and grown accustomed to.

The validity of "consent" can be approached from economics. Economics holds that in the market, when two people agree on a transaction, that transaction is the best transaction. Because a person's "consent" means he holds that the transaction at least does not harm him and may bring him gain. Unanimous consent to a market transaction means both feel they have not been harmed but have benefited. This shows the transaction brought society an increment of wealth and is therefore efficient.

Buchanan extended this principle of consent to the domain of public choice: if a vote is held on a public good, the option all unanimously consent to is the best option. The reason is the same as for unanimous consent in market transactions—no one is harmed, while some may benefit.

Now extend the question further: not voting on a public good but voting on the organization that provides public goods—the government. The reasoning seems the same. If people unanimously consent to establishing a government and to the personnel composing it, it shows they hold this government and its members to be at least harmless to them and possibly beneficial. At this point the government they consent to contains the feature that, at certain times, they must obey its commands; conversely, they consent to the government's using coercive means at certain times to compel all citizens, themselves included, to follow certain social rules. Here, in consenting to form a government, they grant this government coercive power.

When a government obtains authorization consented to by the people, its power contains the authority obtained through consent. That is, although such government power is coercive, in most cases the people comply consciously. Paying taxes is coercive, for instance, but most citizens pay actively. This contains the authority they acknowledge through consent.

Consent regarding social order seems more complex than consent to establishing a government. In many cases it is manifested not as direct consent but as a presupposed consent. Village custom, for instance, is formed by people in long interaction and trial and error, and this already contains the consent of many generations. That is, because custom is voluntarily observed, if someone did not consent he would not observe it, and the custom could not be concretely enforced or handed down. When a larger society forms a social rule of wider coverage, it must absorb and refine many village customs into more general rules. Then this more general rule contains the principles contained in the various customs, and thus contains the consent of the many generations by which those customs formed.

It is worth stressing that people's consent to custom is sometimes not manifested as intuitive consent. For the newly born, for instance, the customs already formed have not passed through their consent. And as Burke said, people do not automatically consent to obligations (2012, p. 70). Obligations are contained in custom, and observed by people, because long history has told people that if they do not fulfill these obligations, they themselves, and the society they belong to, will suffer loss. If there are several competing tribes, those that cannot fulfill obligations (such as military service) will decline and finally vanish; the tribes that survive, and the customs concerning obligation, have continued to this day.

Since the higher-level rule contains the consent of the folk people, it also possesses more authority. People will surely be more inclined to follow rules they consent to and not to follow rules they do not consent to. So if a social rule or law is based on custom, it contains even higher authority than the law made by a legislature—because the latter is only the legislators' consent in conception, while the former is the consent large numbers of people express in action. In the real world, England's legal system formed and developed on the basis of custom, which gives England's common law a very solid foundation of folk consent and therefore higher authority. Professor Albert Venn Dicey noted, "In defending natural rights, the common law is superior to the constitution" (1915)—this is the meaning.

If the highest-level rule, such as a constitution, is summarized and refined from lower rules, then it contains the authority of those lower-level rules, including more of the consent of many generations. Arendt said that "what Madison proposed for the American Constitution—that it draw its 'whole authority' entirely 'from subordinate authorities'—was merely to repeat on a national scale what the colonies themselves had done in constructing state governments. The local and popular assemblies that drafted constitutions for the state governments had their delegates authorized by a great many formally authorized subordinate entities" (2011, p. 149). That is, American federal power too was "stacked up" from the foundation of village self-governance power, its authority extracted and concentrated from village custom.

IV. The Third Source of Authority: The Tradition of Government

The founding of government must have a history of several thousand years. In so long a time, some tyrannies always appear, but under normal conditions government, whatever it is founded upon, provides some basic public services—protecting safety and property, maintaining order, justly adjudicating disputes. Especially in some brilliant periods—the Greek and Roman periods of the Western world, the Han, Tang, and Song periods of China—there was relatively good public governance. Their former existence makes people think government should look like that. So as long as there is a government, people always treat it according to the government of tradition, assuming this government will fulfill the duties it ought to, and likewise holding that the commands and coercive demands the government issues possess authority.

For just this reason, quite a few powers newly founded by revolution proclaim themselves the heirs of some great ancient government. Hannah Arendt noted, "The Americans too must have deliberately emulated the strengths of antiquity, though they perhaps did not much measure themselves against classical greatness—even if Thomas Paine often held that 'America is Athens writ large'… echoing James Wilson's prophecy that 'the glory of America may rival that of Greece and eclipse it'" (2011, p. 182).

The authority drawn from the classical state differed from the tradition of custom and of thought. Arendt said, "They turned to the ancients because they found there a side not handed down by tradition: it was handed down neither by the tradition of custom and institution, nor by the great tradition of Western thought and concept. So what prompted them to return to the beginning of Western history was not tradition; on the contrary, it was their own experience" (2011, p. 183).

In America, the name of the upper house used the name of the ancient Roman senate—senatus. This has strong symbolic meaning: drawing the authority of the senate over. Arendt said, "In ancient Rome, power lay with the people but authority with the senate. Though the American Senate has little in common with its Roman, or even Venetian, prototype, naming the upper house after this Roman institution had great significance. It shows clearly how deeply words entered the hearts of those attuned to the spirit of 'classical prudence.' Among the many changes staged in the American theater, the most notable was that the seat of authority shifted from the (ancient Roman) senate to the judicial branch of government" (2011, p. 185). This is explained rather subtly. What matters is that the American government wished, as a whole, to draw authority from the Roman tradition of government.

Past traditions of government have authority not only because they were once brilliant but because they endured long. And enduring long is because such a tradition contained the factors of success at its founding—and success is definite information by which authority is confirmed. Arendt noted that the Roman senate or consuls "held authority because they represented the ancestors—or rather were the ancestors incarnate; the ancestors' sole right to the authority of the body politic lay precisely in the body politic's having been founded by them: they were the 'founding fathers.' Through the Roman senators, the founders of the city of Rome were present, and by them the spirit of the founding was present—that is, the beginning, foundation, and principle of those great deeds that thenceforth formed the history of the Roman people" (2011, p. 186).

Arendt continued, "To interpret the success of the American Revolution according to the Roman spirit was not arbitrary… The fact is much simpler: they thought of themselves as founders, because they deliberately wished to imitate the Roman example and emulate the Roman spirit… Doubtless America's founders donned the garb of the great men of Rome, and these ancestors were by definition 'the greater ones'" (2011, p. 188). And the American Constitution is both a legal document and the result of the act of founding. So the Constitution itself contains the authority the act of founding brought, and America's success brought by its own enforcement further increased the authority of the founding—so that "the cult of the Constitution in America actually withstood more than a hundred years of nitpicking and denunciation of the document and of all 'truths' self-evident to the founders" (2011, p. 189).

And the people, if they see the present government as the heir of a past successful tradition of government, will assume this government will act like that government in history, will automatically believe its authority, will obey its coercive commands, and will firmly believe all this will bring gain to them and to society as a whole.

V. The Most Important Source of Authority

The three aspects above are only static sources of authority, and are manifested as factors, not as authority itself. Authority itself is constituted mainly by what the government is and what it does.

"What it is" is the social order the government maintains and the social order it may not encroach upon. This concerns the question of what the whole social order, including the legal system, is—whether it is just and efficient. This in turn depends on whether this social order draws on transcendent, sacred principles of justice; whether the social order manifested as law is consented to in principle by the people through due process and contains the values of custom formed in the people's long interaction; whether the social order not manifested as law is a customary tradition formed by the people's interaction; and whether the excellent elements of past governments have been absorbed into this social order.

"What it does" is the present government's actual performance. If the government's conduct does not follow a just and effective social order, it diminishes the government's authority; if the government follows this social rule, it increases the government's authority. Concretely, if the government holds that the social order, including law, is aimed only at the people and does not include itself, it not only directly violates the social rule but harms the social rule itself, weakening both the authority of the social rule and the authority of the government. Again, if the government oversteps the bounds of the law and directly interferes in folk order, it too brings destruction to the social rule and harm to its authority.

For the people, authority from static factors is far less important than the government's present performance—because this happens before their eyes, and is what can most make them believe. So even without the external packaging of the sacred, the popular, and the traditional, as long as in reality the government can follow social rules and thereby bring the people and society actual benefit and long-term prosperity, it strengthens the government's authority. The persistence of such authority forms a new tradition. Conversely, if there is the external packaging of the sacred, the popular, and the traditional, but no present government compliance with just social rules, then the authority those external packagings bring will be eroded, and with the passage of time may finally disintegrate authority.

VI. Violence: A Coercive Force

Regarding violence, people are apt to misunderstand: when they see the people follow government decrees out of fear of punishment, they think this too is a kind of authority, or a factor producing authority. It is not so. We have already defined authority as what makes people consciously follow rules. Violence plainly does not fit this definition. Further, when the government uses violence to compel the people to follow an unjust rule, it not only fails to increase the government's authority but diminishes it. So violence is not authority, nor a factor of authority.

Yet violence is a factor of power. Because power is what makes the people follow a certain rule, and if the people do not follow, power's trump card is to compel them to follow coercively, which requires coercive force. And violence is a coercive force. Conversely, power arises precisely because of situations of individualist failure—where negotiation between people cannot reach an agreement both will voluntarily carry out. Only with violence as the bottom-layer factor of power is power complete. So there is no power without the factor of violence.

But plainly, violence does not fully overlap with power either. Arendt noted, "One of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence is that power always needs numbers, while violence up to a point can be exercised even without numbers" (2013, p. 105). "Numbers" here means the number of those who consent and support. So violence is only one factor by which power can function; the other factor is authority. Power can thus be roughly described as authority plus violence. In theory, there is an optimal combination of the authority factor and the violence factor: where authority can function, violence must not be used. One might also say this optimal combination is one that presses the use of violence to the minimum. Only then is power legitimate power.

More finely, coercive force is not violence alone. Between voluntary agreement and violence there is a spectrum. If one negotiating party has a bargaining advantage, this advantage strengthens as its competitors diminish, and at sole monopoly there is the strongest bargaining force. The government, as an enormous natural monopolist, plainly has means at every level to make others submit. When it can make people comply through non-violent bargaining force, it should refrain from violence as far as possible. So the use of violence can be even less than we imagine.

Even within the range of voluntary agreement, because one party's scale and strength far exceed the others', a mode of inducement by benefit may be adopted. The government's macroeconomic policy, for instance, influences ordinary economic agents by adjusting monetary parameters or the scale of fiscal expenditure. So in fact the government's means are not only to "compel" the people to follow social rules but can be to "induce" them to follow. This further reduces the range of direct use of violence.

Though violence is indispensable to power, it is also the fatal cause driving power to decay. Through the ages, not a few rulers have failed to grasp this distinction between violence and power, thinking that once they hold the reins of power they may use violence at will. When such a ruler finds the people do not comply, or comply less actively, with his commands, he thinks he can raise the rate of compliance by increasing the use of violence; and especially, when he finds the people questioning the legitimacy of his regime, he is the more inclined to use violence to prove and defend its existence. But plainly, if one understands that power is authority plus violence, and that excessive use of violence diminishes authority, one knows the result: the more violence, the less authority, and the smaller the power. As Montesquieu found, "Despotism is the form of government with the most violence and the least power" (quoted in Arendt, 2013, p. 105).

Broadly seen, the government's use of violence is manifested not only as the direct use of violence—the actions of army and police—but as the operation of mechanisms backed by violence. If the government makes an institution or policy harming a portion of the residents, for instance, this portion, cowed by the threat of violence behind the government, can only endure in silence, or be branded law-breaking and punished when they resist; again, if the government makes some law favorable to itself, such as restricting criticism of the government, then when someone criticizes, he is thrown into prison for "breaking the law"; again, in judicial trial, the government directly interferes with the court's just adjudication. These can all be regarded as the government's abuse of violence, which likewise brings harm to authority and diminution of power.

More generally, any improper use of power is equivalent to using violence.

VII. Power and Its Forms

Violence is a factor of power but not the source of power. The source of power is chiefly the source of authority—the sacred, popular will, and tradition. Sacredness is people's pursuit of transcendent justice and their recognition of their own finitude, concretely manifested as a religious or quasi-religious cultural tradition; popular will is democratic legitimacy, that the ruler should obtain the authorization of the ruled; tradition means that present power existed since antiquity and "has always existed," which means its establishment passed the test of time.

Violence, as a factor of power, is only a by-product of the above sources of power. That is, when the people consent to establishing a government and to determining the existing government's structure and composition, they grant the government the appropriate use of violence in exercising power. So violence is a factor determined by the sources of power.

For the government, power is for enforcing. To enforce effectively, certain necessary forms must be adopted. First, power must be exercised by concrete persons—that is, power is not an abstract concept but must be vested in concrete persons. Courts must have judges, public-security agencies police, armies soldiers, the central bank a governor, the finance ministry a minister, and so on.

Second, power must be unique. In a determined region there can be only one government. Because power contains the factor of violence, if there are multiple powers there will be competition in violence, and the result is disaster.

Third, power must have levels. Because power handles public affairs, and the scope of the "public" varies—nation, province, city, county, township—the power of a larger scope should be higher than that of a smaller, and lower power should follow higher. Only thus can the levels of power stack into a single national power. Otherwise, a lower power not following a higher becomes a power competing with the latter, contrary to the principle that power is unique. On the other hand, power should be self-governing within its authorized scope. Though higher power may have jurisdiction over lower, this means only jurisdiction beyond the lower power's authorized scope, and cannot directly interfere within it.

Fourth, power must have structure. Because public affairs include many aspects—legislation, judiciary, administration, examination, supervision, and also national defense, sacrifice, diplomacy, currency, public security, environment, public transport, water conservancy, macro-management. Different power arrangements must be set up for different public affairs, and they adopt different forms of exercising power. National defense needs a violence organization like the army; macro-management needs monetary and fiscal means; examination needs setting questions, invigilating, and grading.

Fifth, governance issues from one gate. Whether viewed as a whole or in part, the highest power should be unique and represented by a concrete person. At the national level there should be a head of state; in legislation, a supreme legislature composed of representatives and members; in an administrative department, a department head. They exercise power by holding office and fulfilling duties as individuals; they make power a living, dynamic institution; and the structure formed among them is the real embodiment of the conceptual power structure. This arrangement requires not only that every aspect of power have a unique person exercising it, but that the consequences of exercising power be accountable.

Sixth, powers should be appropriately checked and balanced. Because power must be exercised by concrete persons, and concrete persons are mortals, and mortals may abuse power for their own interest, to keep power in its proper place—to keep the proportion of power's authority factor and violence factor appropriate, so the violence factor does not function excessively and finally diminish power—one must check the tendency to abuse power, and the simplest method of checking is to have the different powers in the power structure check one another. [Text corrupt in original.]

Seventh, power as a whole should follow the minimum principle: where a problem can be solved without using power, power should not be used. Because in the final analysis power still contains the factor of violence. It is unavoidable, but is not in itself a good thing.

To date, humankind has only one perfect form of power in theory, while the forms of power in reality are not perfect. So the process of pursuing ideal power also contains the inquiry into better forms of power. And from history, government systems have kept changing, which shows too that in reality people have never given up the pursuit of better forms of power.

VIII. Power and Holding Power

So in people's minds there is an ideal government, an ideal power structure, which must exist, and whose existence will surely bring benefit to people and society. To harm and weaken it is to diminish people's welfare and society's prosperity; to protect and cherish it is to protect and cherish the people and society.

Yet in reality, because the government and its power are established by persons of limited reason, this government's institutions are imperfect and its power structure not appropriate. This government and its power must also be operated and exercised by mortals. Mortals are not only of limited reason but harbor private desire; while exercising power to provide public goods, they also consider themselves. If such deviation harms the public good and others' interests, they will try to conceal the information; if someone criticizes, they will suppress the criticism; and in the most extreme case, when they use government power entirely to serve their own interest, they lose legitimacy, meet the people's rejection and resistance, and may use the violence in their hands to suppress it.

Power and the person holding power differ importantly. Power is manifested as certain public offices, and these offices have corresponding obligations. Whoever holds an office, its function and obligation are unchanged. In theory the setting of this office is appropriate and beneficial. If a concrete person enters this office and obtains its title, he is still not one and the same as the office. Human reason is limited and private desire ever-present; the best he can do in this office is to approach the obligations the office requires of him; more likely he does poorly, fulfilling only part of the office's obligations, or worse, mostly or wholly failing to fulfill them. Then he may bear the empty title of the office with no real meaning—as King Zhou of Shang was only nominally a "sovereign," in fact merely a "lone tyrant."

People too are of limited lifespan; power endures, but the person holding it is not eternal.

Conversely, power can still operate in the human world precisely because concrete persons operate it. So one must note that power and the person holding power, the ideal government and the government held by a group of concrete persons, also greatly overlap. Only in concrete situations does the extent of overlap differ. When he is faithful to his duty and strives to fulfill what the office requires—that is, provides the public with the corresponding public services—his overlap with the office is large; when he uses the power the office gives him to seek private gain, thereby violating or even destroying the corresponding social rules, this is equivalent to increasing the violence factor and reducing the authority power should have, and his overlap with the office shrinks.

The difference and overlap between power and the person holding power are not contradictory; these two concepts help us discern the confusion between them. When we see a power-holder's outrages, we should not think that being subject to power is a mistaken setting; when we hold power to be a legitimate institutional arrangement, we should not think the power-holder is the incarnation of that power, such that his abuse of power is also the legitimate use of power itself. When we see a power-holder relying excessively on violence, we should not think his power too great; when we see a government department failing in its duty, we should not think its coercive resources should be increased. The confusion more to be avoided is: when we see a power-holder of ill repute take some action, do not conclude it must be unrelated to his professional duty; when we basically negate a real government, do not think this government's basic functional setting should be abolished.

Of course, some government offices are set inappropriately. This is either because those setting the government structure had a flawed understanding of government function, or because the power-holders themselves set up offices for their own private gain. Then, though the power-holder's effort overlaps greatly with the office's requirements, it does not represent his exercising power. If such an office brings loss to society, then in theory what the power-holder exercises is violence. Only in the case of misunderstanding, this is an error; in the case of private establishment, this is a crime. Broadly, we also regard the deviation between the setting of a government office and the ideal setting required by government function as a deviation between the power-holder and power.

IX. Several Examples of Confusion

The first and most common example is equating the power-holder with power itself. This often comes from the power-holder's deliberate inducement—calling his own decision, not passed through due process of law, "the government's decision"; equating himself with "the government," and then with "the state." If someone criticizes such a power-holder's abuse of power for private gain, he may say the criticism is "attacking the government," even "unpatriotic."

The second example is negating the legitimacy of being subject to power because one thinks the power-holder is a "bad person." If the leader of some Third World country is a dictator, one thinks military means may be used to attack that country. The dictator is to be condemned, but the office the dictator holds includes the content of defending that country. Attacking that country militarily seems to be toppling the dictator, but in fact also includes negating the legitimacy of that country's national defense.

The third example: after a people overthrows tyranny, thinking the tyranny's error was establishing a strong government, they establish too small a government. Too small to provide sufficient public goods—strong national defense outward, effective public security inward—it instead brings social turmoil and weakness. People then yearn for some strong-arm government, providing the social-psychological conditions for a new tyranny.

The fourth example: in Chinese history we often see the concept of "sovereign" (jun). Xunzi said, "Heaven gives birth to the people not for the sake of the sovereign; Heaven sets up the sovereign for the sake of the people." This should refer to the office of sovereign. But people often confuse the office of sovereign with the concrete individual who is sovereign. The intellectual elite often speak of "serving the sovereign," serving the political leader. Do they serve the office of sovereign, or the individual who is sovereign? I believe most Confucian elites are clear. As Huang Zongxi said, "So when I come forth to serve in office, it is for the world, not for the sovereign; for the myriad people, not for one surname" (Waiting for the Dawn). Here "sovereign" refers to the concrete individual. When they say "loyalty to the sovereign," they mean loyalty to the state functions and interests the office of sovereign represents. This is of course also consistent with the long-term interest of the sovereign as concrete individual.

People often say some person or group "only opposes corrupt officials, not the emperor," meaning that only "opposing the emperor" is correct. This results from confusing the emperor as person with the legitimate power the office of emperor represents. As an individual, from today's standpoint, the emperor was not popularly elected, lacks even political legitimacy, and moreover has all sorts of faults and private desires; but as the office of emperor, he is the general representative of the state power structure, whose existence is to provide society with appropriate public goods. "Opposing the emperor" will indeed oppose the various errors and even crimes of the emperor as individual; but unless a better emperor, or a better legal procedure for producing a new leader, immediately replaces him, it in fact also opposes that legitimate power structure and the public services it is to provide.

More examples exist in the complex situations of reality. A power-holder may have many faults and private motives and have done not a few abuses of power, yet also broadly fulfill the obligations power requires—how, in the end, should such a power-holder be treated? If we are in this situation, how should we act? Plainly, the correct approach is to support what appropriate power ought to do and to oppose the power-holder's using power for private gain. Yet "supporting what appropriate power ought to do" must go through the present power-holder, and so must support the power-holder. But if this power-holder's private-gain portion is larger, until he uses almost the whole power structure meant for public service for private gain, under what circumstances should we conclude to negate him completely?

Of course, today we can judge the legitimacy of government power by the three sources of authority—the sacred, popular will, and tradition—what Jiang Qing calls "threefold legitimacy." A power-holder fully conforming to this threefold legitimacy may have greater overlap with the power office. So if we take these three sources of legitimacy as the legitimate procedure or political arrangement for selecting power-holders—such as elections, the setting of a parliamentary upper house, and sacred principles in the constitution—we can expect a better overlap of power-holder and power. But this political procedure is not realized automatically; it needs our effort; and before it is realized, we still face the question of how much the power-holder and power overlap; even after it is realized, this question will not wholly vanish.

If we have an appropriate understanding of power, authority, and violence, and a correct distinction between power and the person holding power, we can discern these several confusions, and can appraise and judge the degree to which a power-holder deviates from the obligations of power. Only then does political science truly reach the practical stage.

X. Conclusion

  1. Power is an institutional arrangement set up so that government fulfills its legitimate duties; it is the bottom-layer guarantee making people follow all social rules.
  2. Power makes people follow social rules in two ways: one is people following voluntarily, one is people following by compulsion.
  3. Authority is what makes people follow social rules voluntarily.
  4. Authority has three sources: sacredness, the consent of the people, the tradition of government.
  5. Sacredness comes from a religious or quasi-religious tradition; it binds all people, especially the highest ruler, making social rules a rule above man, and thus making power contain authority.
  6. Because unanimous consent can bring the best public goods, it can also bring the best government arrangement, government personnel, and government power, which in turn gives the power so formed the support of popular will and thus authority.
  7. Governments in history, especially those of brilliant periods, make people assume the present government is the continuation of that government, and under this assumption accept its decrees, giving the government authority.
  8. The present government's authority comes from "what it is" and "what it does"—what the social rules it maintains are, and its performance in maintaining just and effective rules; if it approaches what it "should be" and "should do," its authority increases; otherwise it decreases.
  9. Violence is a factor of power but not power itself; violence is also not authority, and if violence is used excessively in exercising power, it diminishes authority.
  10. Power is constituted by the authority factor and the violence factor; there is an optimal combination—that of minimizing the use of violence; when violence is used excessively, authority shrinks and power shrinks.
  11. Power and the person holding it differ; assuming the power setting is appropriate, the power-holder is generally of limited reason and harbors private desire; there is also overlap between power and the power-holder, in that the power-holder at least partly exercises the obligations power requires of him; the real situation constituted by this difference and overlap is what political science should discern.

References

Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan, 1915.

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Books, 1990.

Arendt, Hannah, "On Violence," in Crises of the Republic, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2013.

Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution, Yilin Press, 2011.

Burke, Liberty and Tradition, Yilin Press, 2012.

[Sheng Hong, noted economist, Director of the Unirule Institute of Economics, professor at Shandong University. This text was originally published in Academics, 2016, no. 6.]

Reprinted from "Unirule Viewpoint."