The Next Step of Reform: Restrain Public Power to Protect Private Property

The Next Step of Reform: Restrain Public Power to Protect Private Property


By Sheng Hong

 

  FT Chinese: In looking back on forty years of China's reform and opening, property-rights theory is often used to explain the country's rapid economic growth. It is also regarded as the most important Western economic theory China introduced after reform and opening. Could you first briefly describe how this theory and China's reform met?

Sheng Hong: Property-rights theory is part of institutional economics. One of the convictions of institutional economics is that institutions matter—institutions influence behavior, and behavior influences efficiency. It firmly holds that the development of human society and the growth of the economy stem chiefly from institutional change. Property rights are a foundational institution. Property-rights theory holds that if the property-rights system changes in a good direction, it is bound to bring higher efficiency and, over time, economic development. This theory, developed by scholars such as Coase, North, and Steven Cheung, was gradually introduced into China in the early days of reform and opening.

FT Chinese: When China launched reform in 1978, had property rights almost entirely vanished?

Sheng Hong: Strictly speaking they did not vanish; rather, it was a lower-efficiency form of property rights—in the countryside it was called collective property rights: "large in size and collective in nature," with ownership at three levels—which in effect meant there were no private property rights.

Note here that property rights and ownership are distinct, and arise from different backgrounds. Property rights come from a common-law background; they lack the absolute character of ownership, are more flexible, and are rights concerning human conduct. Ownership is a civil-law concept, stressing that ownership of a thing is what counts most and everything else is secondary.

In Chinese history, from the Han through the Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing, and on to the Republic, land was privately owned. In many places land was divided into surface rights and subsoil rights. The surface right resembled a right of operation and management—a property right; the subsoil right resembled ownership, and was in fact also a property right. In common-law countries the two are equal. Surface and subsoil rights could be independently bought, sold, or transferred. So there has long been wisdom of this kind among the Chinese people: the "separation of the two rights" was no British invention. By the people's-commune period, private property rights were abolished, and abolishing private property produced great problems—productivity fell, leading to the great famine.

At the outset of reform and opening, though no nominal transformation of property rights took place—collective property rights were not, for instance, turned into individual property rights—in practice a change resembling a property-rights transformation did occur. In the countryside the reformers said: we will absolutely not change the collective-ownership nature of the land, but to spark the peasant households' enthusiasm we will do it by changing the "contract," implementing the household-responsibility system. In the cities, state enterprises' property rights remained state-owned, but a contracting system emerged, representing a new mode of distribution—like in the countryside, not a property-rights transformation but a contractual one.

Here I must mention Professor Steven Cheung's contract theory, which I consider his most important theoretical contribution. He held that property rights can be decomposed into the right of use, the right to income, and the right of transfer; so long as one can use, obtain income, and transfer, that is enough—whether one nominally holds ownership does not matter. And the household-responsibility system said precisely that a peasant household farming the land, after "paying enough to the state and keeping enough for the collective," keeps "all the rest." What does the rest include? It includes the right of use, the right to income, and part of the right of transfer.

Steven Cheung's theory is important because in early-1980s China, turning collective property rights into individual property rights was politically unworkable, but implementing the household-responsibility system was merely a change at the contractual level, so political resistance became very small; it was accepted by the top of the Party, implemented in China's countryside, and produced especially good results. As Cheung said, though it seemed not to be a property-rights transformation, it closely resembled one and so produced results resembling a property-rights transformation.

Some domestic economists, myself included, were especially persuaded on encountering institutional-economics theory—we felt it wonderful, with strong explanatory power—and kept writing articles to introduce it, kept using it to analyze, kept stressing the importance of property rights. Later, as China's reform moved from countryside to city to industry, the theory gradually entered the discourse of China's reform. The development of Chinese enterprises was likewise propelled by property-rights theory. Private enterprises, needless to say, are surely built on a property-rights foundation, and state enterprises too carried out corporatization reform with reference to this theory; the government put forward the slogan of "clear property rights," and the Party's resolutions from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Congress contained such slogans—one can see that property-rights theory had already entered the mainstream discourse.

FT Chinese: In a 1981 article, Professor Steven Cheung predicted that China would gradually move toward the capitalist road—because he believed China would ultimately become a society of private property rights?

Sheng Hong: Yes. The "capitalism" he spoke of was really the market economy, and the market economy has a foundation: private property rights. At the time it was hard to imagine the Party advocating private property rights. But Cheung's theory said that whether it was nominally private property rights did not matter; what mattered was having the rights of use, income, and transfer. He kept his eye on this aspect, holding that so long as these rights existed, the results would be much the same. He foresaw then that we need not pass through tense political confrontation and violent revolution, need not necessarily change the essence of property rights; so long as the contract changed, reform could work. In this he differed from other economists. Others might think collective land ownership must first be changed to private land ownership before reform could proceed. That is a textbook error, because the textbook says a market economy must have private property rights—China has no private property rights, so how can it develop a market economy? Cheung held that it could—an important piece of foresight.

FT Chinese: In the early reform period, China's property-rights system advanced by way of contractual change. And afterward?

Sheng Hong: Afterward there was a follow-on development. After the household-responsibility system, for instance, some fairly capable peasants emerged who accumulated some wealth—at first in the form of money or daily goods, already in fact their private property. Then they faced the next step: could this accumulated wealth be used for investment? They took their accumulated money and bought some equipment, built some workshops, and township-and-village enterprises appeared; they became capitalists. From township-and-village enterprises developed today's private enterprises—already entirely private property. So the reform path Steven Cheung described is very important. Had everyone been allowed to set up private enterprises from the start, first, ideology would not have accepted it, and second, there was no money. This private property should be generated at the margin, not out of the existing stock: what was public property remained public property, what was collective property remained collective property, and on this foundation, through the household-responsibility system and through all manner of private wealth accumulation, new private property was generated. So there is no contradiction; it was bound to develop that way.

FT Chinese: In recent years a common consensus in Chinese society is that reform has stalled. How does this relate to property rights? Is it that the further privatization of property rights in Chinese society has stopped?

Sheng Hong: It is not merely that. A bigger problem now is that when private property develops to a certain degree—especially when many private enterprises grow very large, on the scale of tens or hundreds of billions—private property rights cannot be effectively protected. Some people use the public power in their hands to forcibly carve up private wealth. Property rights are destroyed—this is why many feel reform has stalled.

FT Chinese: You mean private entrepreneurs still have the freedom to accumulate personal wealth, but safeguarding that wealth has become a problem?

Sheng Hong: Accumulating wealth is fine, but when you build the enterprise very large, government officials will use the public power in their hands to pressure you—for example, demanding a stake of "dry shares" in the enterprise—an extremely common phenomenon. If the entrepreneur refuses, many charges may be trumped up against him: it could be an organized-crime charge, an illegal-fundraising charge, or, most simply, an official can send the tax bureau to investigate whether you have evaded taxes. Because I hold public power, I can encroach and intimidate in all manner of ways, making you fearful, and then, to protect yourself, you can only hand over dry shares. Conversely, once you hand over dry shares to them, you gain a kind of security, because they are now your shareholders too, and you may even gain other benefits. At this point property rights are already impure and cannot be protected; from the standpoint of property-rights theory, the government has not gotten past this hurdle. In a country ruled by law, private property rights are strictly protected, and government officials have no reason—still less the ability—to abuse public power to encroach on private property rights.

FT Chinese: So the main problem now lies in public power's encroachment on private property rights?

Sheng Hong: Yes, manifested in many ways—for example, peasants' land. When a city wants to develop, land near the city is eyed by the government, and a simple method is to compel the requisition of peasants' land. The market value of a mu of land might be five million yuan, and the government gives fifty thousand to make the peasant leave. This is extremely common. At such times property rights are in fact enormously damaged—it is outright seizure of land. Take taxation as another example. A country's tax rate—the share of GDP the government collects in taxes—should be at an appropriate level and should not keep rising. But over the past twenty years China's tax rate has risen steadily, which is unreasonable. Taxation represents the price at which enterprises and citizens buy public goods from the government—a kind of monopoly price, even worse than monopoly, because it has violence as its backing. When the cost of a resource or a component you must buy is unconstrained, your property rights are in fact infringed, because your returns can only grow ever lower.

FT Chinese: So for property-rights theory to work, the premise is a society ruled by law?

Sheng Hong: If property rights can be seized at will, they are not property rights. Conversely, for property rights to be protected, it must be within a society ruled by law, and the most core point of the rule of law is to constrain those institutions and individuals capable of seizing private rights, so that they cannot. If in a society the government's actions are unconstrained by law or constitution, that is equivalent to having no property rights.

FT Chinese: How did private property rights go from being protected and encouraged in the early reform period to being increasingly coveted and seized by public power today?

Sheng Hong: In the 1980s, on the one hand reform had just begun and people were gradually growing richer, but had not yet reached the stage of enormous wealth pouring forth; and most in the special-interest groups of the time had not yet understood how to obtain a larger share under a market system. So at that stage, relatively speaking, China's property-rights system kept moving toward maturity and completeness, and ordinary people's ordinary property rights were protected.

In later development, the special-interest groups began to have two considerations. First, they had tasted the benefits of the market economy and seen the enormous wealth it brought; if they could take a fixed proportion, they would surely be richer than before, so they were willing to keep pushing market-oriented reform, including reform of the property-rights system. In this process China's general judicial system kept advancing—if two ordinary people had a property dispute, the judicial system was indeed more complete than before and could maintain fairness as far as possible. But when a property dispute involved public power, in some cases of ordinary people suing the government, the judiciary regressed instead, because public power would intervene.

Second, the special-interest groups found that the power in their hands had almost no constraint—for instance, there is in fact no constraint on how much they spend each year, and taxation is almost unconstrained too. Nominally the National People's Congress reviews it, but the NPC passes everything every time. Of China's current taxes, only three have a legal basis; the rest have none. At this point those in power feel an imperceptible pressure: a little short of money here today, a little short there tomorrow, so raise a tax or fee a bit here today, a bit there tomorrow. So one sees that the growth rate of taxation far exceeds that of GDP, and the growth of fiscal expenditure exceeds that of fiscal revenue—both revenue and expenditure fairly unconstrained. To put it more fairly, it is not that any individual among them harbors malice; the key is the absence of a rigid institutional constraint, so it keeps rising—which is in fact public power continually seizing the people's property rights.

So on one hand the special-interest groups favor the market, because the market economy can provide an endless stream of wealth—under a planned economy they had no money either. But on the other hand they must demand an unconstrained political power that lets them keep raising their share of the division—of course they will not say so directly; they can call it the leadership of the Party, or Marxism, or the state's macro-control, whatever.

Meanwhile, state enterprises, which make up a large part of China's economy, also found that if they monopolized certain industries and set a high monopoly price, they could reap enormous benefits. Many entrepreneurs remark that in the 1980s and 1990s state enterprises did not yet quite understand it, but later understood it fully: there is so much money in the market, how can we make more in it? If I monopolize banking, I control deposit and loan rates; if I monopolize oil, I control oil prices, and so on. After 2000 monopoly indeed grew ever stronger. In a country ruled by law, competition is the basic principle, and monopoly is permitted only in special circumstances with the special approval of parliament; but our monopolies need no parliamentary approval to operate—they approve themselves—which we call "administrative monopoly."

More serious than monopoly is outright seizure—for instance, targeting some large private enterprises, and many entrepreneurs suddenly seized and thrown into prison, in fact simply because some official coveted their assets. Not many such cases are disclosed, but they exist everywhere.

FT Chinese: A highly controversial phenomenon lately is the Chinese government's "throwing money around" abroad, whether by gratuitous aid or low-interest loans. Is this, in a sense, also a violation of private rights by public power?

Sheng Hong: Of course. In a constitutional country, spending money requires parliamentary approval. President Trump wanted to hold a military parade, then suddenly found it too expensive and dropped it—actually probably under 100 million dollars. China nominally has a review mechanism too, the NPC, but the NPC need not report to society. How much did the Olympics cost, for instance? Nobody knows. How much did the SCO summit or the G20 cost? Nobody knows either.

FT Chinese: Related to this is the "Belt and Road" initiative the Chinese government advocates. There is much controversy about it abroad, one major worry being that China will export its practice of "public power intervening in commercial activity" overseas?

Sheng Hong: The "Belt and Road," considered from a commercial angle, is a good thing—it can open up trade routes. But when the Chinese government treats it as an international strategy, there is a problem, because the crucial point is that it must be driven by the Chinese government, and it will inevitably push the Chinese government's ills onto the whole world. These ills are many—for example, project bidding, where fairness is hard to guarantee. The so-called competitive bids we have taken part in domestically were almost all fixed in advance—a very bad thing. On top of that, state enterprises, in others' eyes, simply are the Chinese government, because they are not only state-owned but have established Party committees, with Party secretaries—can they then truly abide by the commercial rules of a free-market economy? As soon as Mahathir was elected Malaysia's new prime minister, he announced the suspension of "Belt and Road" projects his predecessor had signed with China, because he doubted whether these projects truly benefited his own country. Recently scandals have also broken out of Chinese people bribing abroad, or government-backed network surveillance. If true, exporting this practice of unconstrained public power abroad is a destruction of the world's commercial order.

FT Chinese: The ongoing US-China trade war is superficially caused by trade imbalance between the two countries, but at a deeper level, China's increasingly evident "state advances, private retreats" and public power's erosion of private rights and the market in recent years have caused deep concern in the US and the entire Western world. The US side, for example, has openly criticized the "Made in China 2025" plan. Why does the outside world worry about this plan and the practice it represents—the Chinese government mobilizing the nation's strength to raise the competitiveness of certain industries?

Sheng Hong: This plan nominally aims to advance China's technological progress, but I think it cannot play that role. It is merely a pretext some interest groups use to obtain the more than 600 billion in annual research funding. China's real technological progress relies not on government support but on two sources: one is private research, and private enterprises can seldom obtain research funding; the other is the transfer of foreign technology. Government research funding is in fact a piece of coveted "monk's flesh," and much of the time the application process is a rent-seeking mechanism—the most innovative people often cannot get the money, and those who get it are often the ones with connections who can flatter the leaders. So this system basically produces no real technological progress; it is just a pretext for dividing up money. The other source of technological progress is buying foreign technology and then calling it one's own—like the Hanxin, and the recently exposed Hongxin, scandals. So when someone asks me specifically about "Made in China 2025," my answer is that the US actually need not mind it; it is of no use, because the government will not give the money to a real Einstein.

FT Chinese: From the standpoint of property-rights theory, can state-led industrial policy promote industrial development?

Sheng Hong: At least as we see it, industrial policies all fail. Perhaps some officials of Japan's MITI and some professors would say industrial policy is very importantly linked to the Japanese miracle, but many would also say the Japanese miracle was wholly the work of entrepreneurs—what has it to do with industrial policy? Take the simplest example: Japan once wanted to limit the number of automakers, and Honda was originally not on the list; the government said there are already a dozen-odd, and if you enter too it will be vicious competition. Honda overcame countless difficulties and in the end did the best. Industrial policy played a counterproductive role. On what grounds block an enterprise from making cars? On what grounds is the government smarter than the entrepreneur?

FT Chinese: Another focus of the trade dispute is the entry of foreign and private capital into some of China's key markets, such as the financial and oil markets. In these fields, do you think it likely that China will compromise under external pressure?

Sheng Hong: Not very likely. The unopened domestic markets are, in many cases, markets monopolized by state enterprises, involving enormous interests, all backed by privileged interest groups. Then take abolishing government subsidies to state enterprises—I mean subsidies in the broad sense—these interest groups will hardly give way either. At the start of the trade war, Liu He went to the US and only promised that China would buy more American products, while the other demands the US side raised—abolishing state-enterprise subsidies, opening the domestic market of some important industries, opening the internet—got no commitment from the Chinese side. The Trump team accepted this at first, which rather surprised me, but they soon discovered the problem and went back on it, which I think is only normal.

This interest group is very stubborn, but American pressure persists too. At the least they should already have realized that in this trade war they have not even won China's domestic opinion. Chinese intellectuals have not obviously supported the government, and few at the grassroots have come out in support—because the privileged group has done much harm to ordinary people's interests, forbidding this and disallowing that.

FT Chinese: Will public power's continual seizure of private rights reach a so-called tipping point, a turning point, beyond which irreversible consequences follow?

Sheng Hong: On this question my view lately has grown more pessimistic than before. We are indeed already near a turning point, after which comes economic collapse. The logic is simple: unconstrained public power keeps carving off ever larger interests, and there is an upper limit—the limit being that others can no longer survive. Take the tax rate. China's enterprise tax rate is already so high that enterprises have no room for profit. I toil at running a business, and after paying taxes I earn nothing—so why should I toil? Better to take the money out of the country. The result is that a fairly large number of people will exit the market almost simultaneously within a very short time, en masse. This is the process of economic collapse.

And the authorities are probably not yet aware of this. First, because they have kept raising the tax rate over the years, which has increasingly become inertia. Second, because control of opinion keeps them from knowing danger is near—they carry on like a blind man on a blind horse. This country has no channel for true information. The result is economic collapse, even social upheaval.

To prevent economic collapse, a great statesman must emerge, and this person must be wiser than Deng Xiaoping. First, he must be able to fully reconcile the so-called Marxist ideology with the discourse of marketization and constitutional democracy. Deng did this completely—Marxism was no constraint on him at all. Second, he must be able to withstand the powerful interest groups. But at present we see no such person. There is, of course, another possibility: that within the special-interest groups there are some with long-term vision who realize that insisting on their own group's interests will destroy China's economy and thereby destroy themselves, and so are willing to undertake reform in keeping with the overall interest of society and their own long-term interest.

How serious would the consequences of economic collapse be? Could it, for instance, change China's political structure? Hard to say. Change is easier said than done; the Chinese are unprepared, ordinary people have no genuine tradition of democratic self-governance or spirit of contract, and, as Hannah Arendt said, democracy needs such a foundation—otherwise it is just a mob.

Of course it is not wholly pessimistic. The market economy has developed for many years, and over these years there has been one especially important democratic training for society: the company. A company is a miniature constitutional-democratic system—it must abide by company law and articles of association, and has a board elected by the shareholders' meeting, a chairman, and a management layer. Nor should we underestimate the villagers' self-governance practiced for many years in the countryside. Village elections now cannot be entirely manipulated by higher levels or have their rules ignored; people increasingly operate by the rules fairly seriously.

FT Chinese: Returning to property-rights theory and China's reform. How can property-rights theory guide China's reform to break through the blockage and keep moving forward?

Sheng Hong: The goal of reform now should be to constrain power. The root of many problems in our society lies in public power being unconstrained; all the threats to property rights come from public power—this is the core. The threat from private rights is neither important nor great; the odds of your things being seized by other ordinary people are very low, and you have means to resist. But against public power there is no means. So this is surely the most dangerous, and the most important and most core matter.

Reprinted from "Unirule Viewpoint."